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I. INTRODUCTION
Open internal borders hallmark the success of the European Union model.
Yet, along with the increased mobility of persons, information, and capital
throughout Europe comes the difficultjob of regulating the illicit trade of small
arms.' In 1991, against the backdrop of Europe's differing perceptions of gun
ownership and regulation and its recently abolished internal frontiers,' the
European Union took steps toward "harmoniz[ing] gun control standards" in
an effort to "insure a degree of control that would eliminate the necessity of
border checks"3 by enacting Council Directive 91/4777/EEC (1991 Directive).4
This legislation, aimed at allowing the free movement of goods and people,
authorized firearm carriers to move freely throughout the European
Community.5 However, during a highly publicized, seven-year period of
deadly school shootings in Germany and Finland6 following the legislation, the
European Community recognized that the 1991 Directive lacked the substance
to control violence in the European states.
Coupled with the efforts of the United Nations to strengthen the fight
against the illicit trade of firearms by organized crime,7 the European Union
Although there remains debate over the exact definition of "small arms," the use of the
phrase in this Note will correspond to the United Nations' definition: small arms include
"[rievolvers and self-loading pistols; [r]ifles and carbines; [s]ub-machine-guns; [a]ssault
rifles; [and] [f]ight machine-guns .... ." The Secretary-General, Report of the Panel of
Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 26, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/52/298 (Aug. 27, 1997). References to "firearms" in this Note will include a narrower class
of weapons than small arms, although the reader should consider civilian firearms and firearms
intended for military use as interchangeable unless otherwise noted.
2 The Single European Act art. 13, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, required Member States to
relinquish the power to carry out border checks which impede the free movement of people and
goods across intra-community frontiers.
' Christina Eigel, Comment, Internal Security in an Open Market: The European Union
Addresses the Need for Community Gun Control, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 429, 431
(1995).
4 Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on Control of the Acquisition and
Possession of Weapons, 1991 O.J. (L 256) 51 [hereinafter Council Directive 91/477/EEC].
' Eigel, supra note 3.
6 Dan Bilefsky, European Legislators Back Tough Gun Control Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/world/europe/29iht-
29union.4.8530991.html?_r'l.
7 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8,2001) [hereinafter UN Convention]; Protocol Against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A.
Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 (June 8, 2001) [hereinafter UN Protocol]. The use of
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took steps to address the continued fear of violence inflicted upon European
citizens through access to illegal firearms. In 2007, the European Parliament
set in motion a series of amendments targeted at curing the failures of the 1991
Council Directive.8
This Note will analyze whether the 2008 amendments to the 1991 Council
Directive adequately address the challenges of regulating the illicit trade of
small arms in the European Community, and act as a means of curbing
increased firearm violence. Ultimately, this Note takes the position that the
design of the 2008 amendments is inadequate to control the flood of illicit
weapons into Europe through channels orchestrated by organized crime
networks, arms brokers, and individuals with the incentives to acquire or sell
illegal firearms.
This Note assesses the 2008 amendments in light of their effect on intra-
Community trade flow instead of attempting to gauge relative security through
firearm violence rates. The 1991 Directive, which sought to harmonize
Member-State regulations pertaining to the interstate movement of firearms,
did so because these State regulations threatened the hallmark objective of the
European Union-open internal borders. Although individual Member States
still may institute regulations to combat firearm violence, the 1991 and 2008
Council Directives attempt to procure the common end of reducing violence by
blocking access to small arms from illicit trade flow. In other words, the aim
of the legislation is to reduce illicit firearm transfers, not to directly curb
violent firearm use. As such, the EU legislation's success in reducing trade
flow can be measured in terms of whether individuals have access to illicit
firearms, the ease of access to these weapons, and the extent of their
availability. In light of such considerations, this Note addresses the access to
illicit firearms that has surfaced as a byproduct of increased, legal trade flow
between Member States, and endeavors to analyze whether unified action in the
form of EU legislation can effectively curb illicit trade flow.
Part H of this Note looks at the nature of small arms trade in both the global
and European markets as well as the available data on civilian violence
resulting from the trade. Part III explores the history of firearm legislation of
European Member States and of the EU, focusing on the events that galvanized
consensus for each piece of legislation. Part IV discusses the specific
components of the 1991 Council Directive and the technical changes enacted
"firearms" in this context includes firearms, firearm components, and ammunition.
8 Directive 2008/5 1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008
Amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on Control of the Acquisition and Possession of
Weapons, 2008 O.J. (L 179) 5 [hereinafter Directive 2008/51/EC].
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by the 2008 amendments, highlighting the motivations behind these
amendments. Finally, Part V evaluates the potential effectiveness of the 2008
amendments in light of the nature of the illicit trade of small arms in Europe.
II. SMALL ARMS TRADE
An estimated 200,000 deaths per year result from the use of firearms in non-
conflict-related violence and crime worldwide.9 Western Europe has some of
the lowest rates of firearm homicide, but some of the highest rates of firearm
suicide, in the world.' ° Studies attempting to determine the rates of non-fatal
firearm violence also indicate that Western Europe's rates are some of the
lowest in the world.I" Central and Eastern Europe, however, experience levels
of firearm mortality nearly similar to world averages. 2 Central and Eastern
Europe experience more firearm homicides than firearm suicides, 3 but firearm
suicides still occur more frequently here than in the rest of the world, on
average. 4 Despite relatively low firearm mortality on the continent, the
European public has become collectively responsive to firearm violence in
recent years after several mass killings occurred. As a result of these highly
publicized events, the European Community (EC) began to question the
effectiveness of its existing firearm legislation, launching an extensive
investigation into the nature of the small arms trade in Europe. Specifically the
EC attempted to identify exactly what made these mass killings logistically
possible.
The cross-border trade of small arms in Europe occurs within three
overlapping markets that are global in scope: the legal market, the "grey
market," and the black market. 5 In general, the legal market for small arms
9 GRAD. INST. INT'L STUD. GENEVA, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004: RIGHTS AT RISK 174
(2004). This number is contrasted with the estimated 300,000 deaths resulting from armed
conflicts worldwide. Id. It is important to note, when considering the relationship between
firearms and crime, that firearms are responsible for only 6% of suicides globally, as compared
with 40% of homicides globally. Id. at 175.
10 Id, at 178 fig.6.3.
" See id. at 179 box 6.2 (noting "[t]he lowest victimization rates are experienced in Western
Europe and Asia"). This study looked at urban areas only. Id.
12 Id. at 178 fig.6.3.
13 Id.
"' See id. (providing that Central and Eastern Europe experience 1.4 firearm suicides
per 100,000 people, while the average for the world is 1.3 per 100,000 people).
5 Elise Keppler, Comment, Preventing Human Rights Abuses by Regulating Arms
Brokering: The US. Brokering Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, 19 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 381, 386 (2001).
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includes transfers between governments or between a government and a private
company. 6 These legal transfers comply with national export laws as well as
international and regional arms-control regulations. 7 Grey market transfers
occur on the fringes of legal transfers.'8 Although these transfers may
technically comply with applicable regulations, they involve transfers that may
compromise the spirit of national and international arms control efforts. 9
Examples of grey market transfers include state-sponsored or -supported
transfers that are covert or politically contentious but still legal because the
state is not subject to commercial export controls; private-entity exploitation
of loopholes in weak export-control regimes; and the "diversions of weapons
by the intended end-user or contractual recipient to an unauthorized third
party."20  Lastly, transfers on the black market encompass "transactions
conducted by non-government entities, individuals, and private companies"
explicitly violating firearm regulations and export-control laws.2'
Although the majority of arms trade is technically legal, an
estimated 100/o-20% of small arms sales worldwide occur illicitly.22  As
recognized by the United Nations, organized crime accounts for a concerning
level of the illicit trade of firearms throughout Europe and the world.23 In the
European Union, where most Member States' gun regulations restrict the
ability to acquire such weapons legally,24 organized crime circuits profit by
satisfying the demand for difficult-to-acquire contraband, including firearms.
2
Guns smuggled into and throughout the European Union feed a market demand
from criminals, as well as (to a lesser extent) Separatists in Northern Ireland,
16 Id.
17 Id.
IS Id.; see also Silvia B. Cucovaz, The Role of the "Grey Market" in the Context ofArms
Trafficking, circulated at the Second Meeting of U.N. Office Small Arms and Light Weapons, 14
(Mar. 24-28,2004), available at http://disarmament.un.org/CAB/docs/trcngexperts/scucovaz1.
pdf (concluding that sometimes, players operate legally in the "grey market" knowing that at
some point the operation will become illegal).
'9 GRAD. INST. INT'L STUD. GENEVA, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007: GuNs AND THE CITY 73
(2007) [hereinafter SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007].
20 Keppler, supra note 15, at 386.
21 Id. at 387.
2 Federation of American Scientists, The Illicit Arms Trade,
http://www.fas.org/asmp/campa igns/smallarms/IssueBrief3ArmsTrafficking.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2009).
23 U.N. Convention, supra note 7; U.N. Protocol, supra note 7.
24 James Graff et al., Gunning for It, TIME EUR., May 13, 2002, at 50, available at http://
www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2002/0513/guns/story.html.
25 James J. Killean, Der GrofieLauschangriff. Germany Brings Home the War on Organized
Crime, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 175 (2000).
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the Basque Regions, and Corsica.2 6 Firearms may now frequently travel
alongside other black-market items, such as illegal drugs2 7:
From "recreational drugs" to counterfeit credit cards, from fake
designer watches to stolen diamonds, it is no longer a case of the
operation of this or that isolated black market, but rather the
emergence of an international underground economy.
The general result of the combination of new arms dealers and
the spread of underground economic activity is that covert arms
deals are likely to take place within a matrix of black-market
transactions.2"
In the 2005 Organized Crime Report, Europol emphasized Member-State
concern over the correlation between "enlargement of the EU" and the presence
of illegally trafficked firearms.29 Europol attributes this correlation to the
operations of organized crime networks in the Western Balkans and Eastern
Europe.3" In particular, Bulgarian organized crime groups significantly impede
the fight against illicit firearm-trafficking within the Member States.3 Hand-
made Bulgarian weapons are smuggled into Western Europe through Turkey,
Serbia, and Montenegro, and sold for a profit of 800%.32
Logistically, the movement of small arms between legal and illicit channels
occurs in a variety of ways. An explanation of the various methods of
diverting firearms into illicit channels is crucial to evaluating legislation aimed
26 Toine Spapens, Trafficking in Illicit Firearmsfor Criminal Purposes Within the European
Union, 15 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. &CRIM. JUST. 359,360 (2007), available athttp://amo.uvt.ni/
show.cgi?fid=68801.
27 Gavin Hales et al., Gun Crime: The Market in and Use of Illegal Firearms, in
FINDNGS 279, at 3 (U.K. Home Off., Res. Dev. & Stat. Directorate, 2006), available at http://
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/r279.pdf.
2 R.T. Naylor, The Structure and Operation of the Modern Arms Black Market, in LETHAL
COMMERCE: THE GLOBAL TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS 44, 48-49 (Jeffrey
Boutwell et al. eds., 1995).
29 Council of the E.U., Europol, 2005 EU Organised Crime Report-Public Version, at 24,
13788/1/05 REV 1 (Nov. 17,2005), availableathttp://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Or
ganisedCrimeReport2005.pdf.
30 Id. at 32.
"' Id. at 24.
32 Id.
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at combating illicit trade. Figure 1 provides an overview of illicit firearm
transfer patterns.
FIGURE 1. METHODS OF DIVERTING FIREARMS INTO ILLICIT TRADE CHANNELS
33
Most illicit firearms are either legally manufactured or legally procured
before they slip into illicit channels; 34 however, the illicit manufacture of
firearms does account for a small percentage of illicit firearms in Europe.35
33 Spapens, supra note 26, at 362.
34 KEITH KRAUSE, CAN. DEP'T FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE, SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT
WEAPONS: PROLIFERATION PROCESS AND POLICY OPTIONS 18 (2000).
31 See Spapens, supra note 26, at 363 ("Of the firearms that were seized between 1998
and 2000, an estimated 95% or more were originally legally manufactured. However, firearms
are also manufactured illicitly.").
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Illicit manufacture involves one of three scenarios: (1) the firearm is an
amateur fabrication assembled in the home; (2) the firearm is an illicit copy
assembled in a factory; or (3) the firearm was produced legally but then
fraudulently diverted by the manufacturer.36
Because a firearm consists of only a few working parts, amateur firearm
fabrication involves "modest tools."37 For example," 'craft' "manufacturers
in Britain circumvent regulations by converting non-lethal replicas, such as air
guns and BB guns, into lethal firearms.3" Although lethal firearms can be
deactivated into non-lethal forms, craft manufacturers re-insert these weapons
into illicit channels by reactivating their components.3 9
The circulation of illicit factory fabrications can also be a problem for EU
countries. For example, the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s saw firearms being
manufactured in a "legal twilight area." Small factories in Croatia produced
illicit firearms to "meet the great demand for weapons."' The Dutch police
seized several dozen of these Croatian-built machine pistols42 between 1998
and 2000.4'
Other firearm diversion tactics involve theft from legal dealers or private
owners of legal firearms,' and fraud committed by legal firearm owners in
"straw purchases."' A straw purchase, in this context, occurs when a firearm
is "bought licitly by someone with a clean record and then sold or given to a
second owner." Because these transfers are more likely to occur in a country
without strong licensing and registration laws, straw transactions are of
particular importance to the EU in making regulation decisions.47
Often, arms brokers exploit under-regulated markets to facilitate the transfer
of small arms.48 Brokering involves the private dealing of arms, in which the
36 id.
" The simplest firearm design, while still lethal, is composed of a barrel, a spring with a
housing pin, and a housing unit. Id.
38 WENDY CUKIER, PEACEBUILD, SMALL ARMS WORKING GROUP, THE ILLICIT TRADE IN
SMALL ARMS: ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF DIvERsION 6 (2008), http://www.ploughshares.
ca/libraries/Congrol/SAWG08Cukier2.pdf.
39 Id.
4 Spapens, supra note 26, at 364.
41 Id.
42 These Croatian weapons were illicit copies of the Israeli UZI. Id.
43 Id.
4Id.
" CUKlER, supra note 38, at 7.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See RACHEL STOHL ET AL., THE SMALL ARMS TRADE: A BEGINNER'S GUIDE 50 (2007)
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broker often negotiates the terms of a sale, locates arms suppliers, and arranges
the logistics of the transaction.49 Although this statistic is difficult to assess
accurately, it appears that a significant number of the world's arms brokers
"operate from Europe."5 Brokers operate in a variety of ways to complicate
the tracking and identification of their transactions. Brokers are notorious for
evading accountability by "inserting distance between [their] suppliers and
recipients, [creating] a chain of associates and various bases of operation"":
In some cases the arms will be delivered by a shipping firm based
in one country, with its aeroplane registered in a second, which
flies out from a third, will pick up arms in a fourth country, re-
fuel in a fifth, be scheduled to land in a sixth, but actually will
deliver its lethal consignment in a seventh country.52
Brokers often operate outside their country of citizenship and outside both the
supplying and receiving nations.53 Also, these brokers often exploit the
differences in national laws governing these transactions.54
Finally, illicit traders divert firearms by abusing end-user certificates
(EUCs).55 An EUC, required for most transnational arms transfers, constitutes
paper verification that the small-arms transaction is legitimate and legal.56
Diversion of small arms into illicit channels using EUCs usually occurs in one
of two scenarios: (1) the EUC is "signed by authorized but corrupt officials"
within the recipient government who then transfer the firearms to an
(noting that brokering "is an under-regulated area of the small-arms trade").
4 Keppler, supra note 15, at 382.
50 See id. at 387 (noting that "[p]recise data on arms brokers are not available, as the brokers
tend to operate in secrecy").
5 Id. at 388.
52 See id. (quoting OxFAM, OUT OF CONTROL: THE LOOPHOLES IN UK CONTROLS ON THE
ARMS TRADE § 2 (1998)).
13 Id. at 382.
" See STOHL ET AL., supra note 48, at 50 (noting that "only around forty countries have
adopted legislation on [arms] brokering").
" Michael T. Klare, The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the linternational System in the
Post-Cold War Era, in LETHAL COMMERCE, supra note 28, at 34.
56 Id.
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unauthorized final destination, or (2) the EUC is counterfeited. 7 Increasingly,
arms brokers have facilitated these types of transactions.58
III. EVOLUTION OF GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION IN THE EU
Historically, there has been a spectrum of approaches among EU Member
States, in their individual sovereign capacities, regarding the issue of citizen
firearm possession and acquisition. At one end of the spectrum, states like the
United Kingdom59 and the Netherlands" have traditionally advocated stringent
regulation of firearms. Nordic states, like Finland, generally occupied the other
end of the spectrum, preferring more lenient regulation of firearms.6
The Netherlands passed its Firearms Act in 1919, imposing the requirement
of an "official certificate" for "the import, export, manufacture, supply or
possession of a gun." '62 The Act applied to sporting guns as well as items
resembling a firearm.63
The United Kingdom addressed firearm possession and acquisition in
its 1968 Firearms Act." This Act required a firearms certificate for the
possession of a firearm or ammunition,65 while a separate certificate was
required for the possession of shot guns and ammunition.6 The Act generally
prohibited automatic weapons.67 These regulations exempted, among other
57 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY, WEAPONS UNDER SCRUTINY: IMPLEMENTING
ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMBATING SMALL ARMS PROLFERATION IN BULGARIA 46-47
(Philip Gounev et al. eds., 2004).
" See Katharine Orlovsky, Note, International CriminalLaw: Towards New Solutions in the
Fight Against IllegalArms Brokers, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 343, 343,346 (2006)
(noting that "arms brokers continue to enjoy broad impunity under existing international and
domestic law" and that "end-user certificates can be, and often are, forged or falsified").
59 See SMALLARMsSURVEY2007,supranote 19, at 59 box 2.6 (referencing the"strong anti-
gun culture" of England and Wales and the "regulative barriers [that] inhibit buying, keeping
ownership far below the levels that wealth alone would anticipate").
o See Spapens, supra note 26, at 360 (describing the Netherlands's regulatory regime as
historically "one of the most restrictive weapon laws in Europe").
61 See Associated Press, Facts and Figures About Finland's Gun Culture, HUFFINGTON
POST, Sept. 23, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20080923/eu-finland-guns-
glance/ (observing that "Finland has some of Europe's most relaxed gun laws" and that "Finns
say their hunting traditions justify widespread gun ownership").
62 Eigel, supra note 3, at 431.
63 See id. (noting that the Act extended to "items which might be confused for a real
firearm").
4 Firearms Act, 1968, c. 27 (Gr. Brit.).
65 Id. pt. 1, § 1.
6 Id. pt. 1, § 2.
67 Id. pt. 1, § 5. The Act provides a standard definition of automatic weapons, stating, "if
246
A BRIGHT DAY FOR THE BLACK MARKET
things, firearms used in sporting events, in theatre or cinema, and for the
slaughter of animals.6"
Finland, in contrast, did not pass any legislation regulating firearms
until 199869-only after Directive 91/477/EEC took effect. Finland established
only the minimum requirements for compliance with the EU Directive on
harmonization. For example, Finns aged fifteen and older were allowed to
possess a firearm with parental consent.70 Finnish reluctance to tighten gun-
control regulation is often attributed to the country's long-standing hunting
tradition and the influence of the hunting lobby on legislators.7
The differing national conceptions of gun ownership rights created a
particular challenge to the European Union in its formative years. Of particular
concern to the young European Union were the security problems that would
arise from abolishing internal border checks. As discussed below, early
agreements between the European states recognized the need to balance
security with freedom of movement.
In 1957, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands signed the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC Treaty).7 2  The treaty required the signatory states to
establish a common market that would embody "four freedoms" of movement:
that of persons, goods, capital, and services. 73 As a means of facilitating the
transition to and perpetuation of the European common market, the EEC Treaty
called for the implementation of common policies among the signatory states.74
The harmonization of national laws to facilitate internal cross-border
movement became one of the main objectives of the transition. 75 After the
pressure is applied to the trigger, missiles continue to be discharged until pressure is removed
from the trigger or the magazine containing the missiles is empty." Id pt. 1, § 5(1)(a).
68 Id. pt. 1, §§ 7-15.
69 Firearms Act (1998) (Fin.).
70 Id. § 45.
71 Steve Rosenberg, Angry Finland Focuses on Gun Laws, BBC NEWS, Sept. 24, 2008,
http:/ news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7633538.stm.
72 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 2984
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. This treaty is more commonly referred to as the Treaty
of Rome, or Rome Treaty.
13 Id. pt. II.
"4 EUROPA, Summaries of EU Legislation, Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, EEC Treaty, http://europa.eu/legislationsummaries/institutional-affairs/treaties/
treaties-eec-en.htm (last visited Nov.25,2009) [hereinafter Summaries of EU Legislation: EEC
Treaty].
" EEC Treaty, supra note 72, art. 100; see also Eigel, supra note 3, at 429 ("As the
European Union (EU) works toward a single common market, the free movement of goods,
services and people has been a primary goal.").
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Single European Act of 1986 required the final establishment of the internal
market by 1992,76 the European Commission proposed a Council Directive that
would harmonize rules governing the acquisition and possession of weapons
in order to facilitate the movement of persons77 across internal EC borders as
mandated by the EEC Treaty.78 The European Community adopted the 1987
Proposal as Council Directive 91/477/EEC in 1991.71
Debate ensued in the 1980s as to the exact meaning of the "free movement
of persons," as required by the founding treaties of the European Union."°
Some Member States believed the EEC Treaty called for the free movement of
EU citizens only, while others believed the treaty implicated the free movement
of all people within the EU.8 l Although the Member States did not reach
a consensus, five Member States 2 signed an independent agreement on
June 14, 1985 to eliminate internal borders, thus establishing the "Schengen
area. 8 3 A second agreement was signed on June 19, 1990.84 The Schengen
Agreement abolished internal border checks and created one external border.8
The concern over decreased security controls from the lack of internal border
checks led the signatory states to include a series of "compensatory"
measures.8 6 These measures aimed to "improv[e] cooperation and coordination
between the police and the judicial authorities" of each signatory state-mainly
76 Summaries of EU Legislation: EEC Treaty, supra note 74.
" At the inception of the European Union, some Member States had conflicting firearm
legislation that would render it difficult for European citizens to travel within the EU without
potentially violating a neighboring nation's gun laws.
78 Proposal for a Council Directive on the Control of the Acquisition and Possession of
Weapons, 1987 O.J. (C 235) 8 [hereinafter 1987 Proposal].
" Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 4.
80 EUROPA, Summaries of EU Legislation: The Schengen Area and Cooperation, http://eur
opa.eu/legislationsummaries/justice 
-freedom-security/free movement-Of-persons-asylum
_immigration/133020_en.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
81 Id.
82 The five European states were France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands. Lauren Gilbert, National Identity and Immigration Policy in the U.S. and the
European Union, 14 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 99, 120 (2008). After 1990, the Schengen area would
continue to expand, eventually including all EU Member States, with the exception
of Britain and Ireland. Desmond Dinan, Fifty Years of European Integration: A Remarkable
Achievement, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1118, 1133-34 (2008).
83 The agreement was signed in Schengen, Luxembourg. Summaries of EU Legislation: The
Schengen Area and Cooperation, supra note 80.
' Id. This agreement took effect in 1995, and was signed by the original signatories to the
first Schengen Agreement. Id.
85 Id.
8 Id.
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by establishing the Schengen Information System (SIS). s7 The SIS would
facilitate coordination between these legal authorities by providing
sophisticated information on certain people and goods in an effort to combat
organized crime.88 Additionally, Articles 77-90 of the Schengen Agreement
dealt specifically with the harmonization of national firearms and ammunition
legislation.89 These provisions demonstrate an early recognition of the need for
sensitive attention to the movement of firearms across internal borders for the
success of the Schengen area, in terms of security and politics.
After the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997,90 there was some
confusion as to whether Articles 77-90 of the Schengen Agreement or
Directive 91/477/EEC would govern the harmonization of gun legislation by
Member States.9 In 1999, a Council Decision declaring that Directive
91/477/EEC would supersede Articles 77-81 and Articles 83-90 of the
Schengen Agreement92 settled the matter.93
Between 199394 and 1997, 9' each Member State transposed the provisions
of Directive 91/477/EEC into national legislation.96 Pursuant to Article 17 of
Directive 91/477/EEC, the Commission created a report in 2000 concerning the
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Schengen Acquis- Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985,
tit. III. Ch. 7, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19 [hereinafter Schengen Acquis].
9' The Treaty of Amsterdam, one of eight amendments to the EEC Treaty, incorporated the
Schengen Agreements into EU law. Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol Integrating the Schengen
Acquis Into the Framework of the European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 96.
91 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The
Implementation of Council Directive 91/477/EEC, of 18 June 1991, on Control of the
Acquisition and Possession of Weapons, 10, at 5-6, COM (2000) 837 final (Dec. 15, 2000)
[hereinafter 2000 Implementation Report].
92 Article 82 of the Schengen Agreement is still in effect. Article 82 lists three categories
of firearms not subject to prohibition, authorization, or declaration: antique firearms (firearms
manufactured prior to 1870), reproductions of antique firearms, "provided that they [are unable
to] fire metal-case cartridges," and firearms officially stamped as "unfit to fire any kind of
ammunition." Schengen Acquis, supra note 89, art. 82.
9' Council Decision 1999/436/EC of 20 May 1999, Annex B, art. 2, pt. 1, 1999 O.J.
(L 176) 17, 21.
94 The European Community adopted Directive 91/477/EEC on January 1, 1993. European
Commission, Enterprise and Industry: Directive 91/477/EEC as a Measure in Support of Internal
Market Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/dir91477_en.htm (last visited
Nov. 25, 2009).
9' Austria, Finland and Sweden were given until the 1997 to "transpose" the Directive. 2000
Implementation Report, supra note 91, 2, at 4.
96 Id,
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implementation of the Directive.97 This report included an update from
Member States on the implementation and operation of the Directive,98 as well
as suggestions for its improvement." Finally, the Report stated that, in light
of the then-draft of the United Nations Protocol addressing the illicit
manufacture and trafficking of firearms, "certain provisions of the Directive
may need to be adapted to be brought into line with those of the Protocol."'' 0
Shortly after the Commission Report was submitted to the European
Parliament and Council, the United Nations adopted a resolution in 2001
establishing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime (Organized Crime Convention).'0 ' The UN General Assembly adopted
a resolution, unfinished as of the date of the Organized Crime Convention, to
supplement this Convention with the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing
of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition
(UN Protocol). 0 2 In January 2002, the European Commission signed the UN
Protocol on behalf of the European Community. 0 3
A proposal to amend Directive 91/477/EEC came in 2006,"° arising from
new international obligations based on the UN Protocol and the issues
identified in the 2000 Report.'0 5 Tragic events in the Member States also
galvanized domestic support for change in the existing approach to
harmonization of firearm legislation.0
6
Several horrific massacres within Member States-notably, the United
Kingdom, Germany and Finland-led to demands for tighter gun controls. On
March 13, 1996, in Dunblane, Scotland, a forty-three-year-old man named
Thomas Hamilton entered a primary school and opened fire, killing sixteen
five- and six-year-olds and their teacher before killing himself'0 7 Hamilton
arrived at the primary school with "two semi-automatic pistols[,] two . . .
revolvers, [and] 743 rounds of ammunition."' 8 Subsequent investigations
97 Id. 711, at 4.
98 Id. 1 36-88, at 9-17.
99 Id. 89-106, at 17-20.
0 Id. 120, at 22.
101 UN Convention, supra note 7.
102 UN Protocol, supra note 7.
103 Council Decision 2001/748/EC of 16 October 2001, 2001 O.J. (L280) 5.
104 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC, COM (2006) 93 final (Mar. 2, 2006).
105 Bilefsky, supra note 6.
106 Id.
1"7 BBC News, On this Day, 13 March, 1996: Massacre in Dunblane School Gym, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/1 3/newsid_2543000/2543277.stm.
1"s BBC: h2g2, The Dunblane Massacre, May 15, 2006, http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/
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revealed that the local man "had licenses for six guns."'" Following the
massacre, concerned UK citizens started the Snowdrop Campaign, petitioning
Parliament for the complete ban of handguns."' In 1997, the efforts of the
Snowdrop Campaign produced an amendment to the Firearms Act banning all
privately owned handguns in the United Kingdom."'
Similar shootings in Germany and Finland solidified fears of a growing
"'gun-friendly culture' "in Europe."' What has been called the most deadly
incidence of violence in post-WWII Germany occurred at the Gutenberg
School in Erfurt on April 26, 2002 when a recently expelled nineteen-year-old
shot and killed seventeen people before killing himself.' '3 The teenager had
legally obtained his firearm-a handgun-through his membership in a local
gun club."' In southern Finland, on November 8, 2007, an eighteen-year-old
killed eight people at his high school before killing himself."5 Less than a year
later, a twenty-two-year-old gunman killed nine people at his college in
western Finland before shooting himself in the head." 6 The gunman used
a .22-caliber handgun, which he had obtained legally." 7 Although the 2008
shooting prompted fierce debate in Finland regarding the leniency of its gun
laws, the laws were not changed." 8
Al 1103580.
109 Massacre in Dunblane School Gym, supra note 107.
"0 The Dunblane Massacre, supra note 108.
11 Id.
12 Bilefsky, supra note 6.
113 See Edmund L. Andrews, Shooting Rampage at German School, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2002, at Al (noting that, before this, "[tihe worst case of such violence in postwar Germany had
been an incident last fall in Munich, when a student killed three people").
14 See Jochen Wiesigel, Germany Remembers Worst School Shooting, WASH. POST, Apr. 26,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/26/AR2007042
601025.html (noting that the shooter "was a gun club member licensed to own weapons").
1' Reuters, Student Kills 8, andHimself at Finnish High School, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,2007,
at A20.
116 Id.
17 See Gunman Kills 10 at Finnish Trade School, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/09/23/world/europe/23iht-finland.4.16418825.html (noting that after the
shooting, "the government said it would raise the minimum age for buying guns from 15 to 18,
but insisted there was no need for sweeping changes to gun laws").
110 Associated Press, Gunman Kills 10 in Attack at School in Finland, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2008.
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In May 2008, galvanized by the fear and concern surrounding a decade of
fatal school shootings,"9 the European Community passed Directive 2008/5 1/EC
(the 2008 Directive), amending Directive 91/477/EEC (the 1991 Directive). 2 1
IV. DIRECTIVES OF 1991 AND 2008
The 1991 Directive, as stated previously, embodied a compromise between
Member State concerns arising from the abolition of internal-frontier controls
and the need to control the acquisition and possession of firearms among the
Member States. The 1991 Directive required Member States to comply with
a minimum threshold of harmonization, while allowing for the enactment of
"more stringent" domestic firearms controls based on the particular attitude
toward gun control within each Member State.' 21 In order to ease the security
concerns arising from the free movement of persons across intra-frontier
borders, the 1991 Directive generally prohibited persons in possession of a
firearm from passing from one Member State to another absent compliance
with the Directive's procedural requirements.'22 For persons not qualifying as
arms dealers, 23 the main procedural requirement is possession of a European
firearms pass (EFP). 24 The EFP is a "non-transferable document" issued by
the authorities of a Member State upon request of a person legally obtaining a
firearm. 25 The EFP lists all firearms possessed by the EFP holder and must
stay on the holder's person at all times while traveling with a firearm.'26 The
EFP is valid for five years, unless issued for only Category D firearms, in
which the EFP is valid for ten years. 27 Changes in either the "possession or
characteristics of the firearms" must be noted on the EFP.1
21
"9 Bilefsky, supra note 6.
120 Directive 2008/51/EC, supra note 8.
121 Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 4, art. 3.
122 See id. pmbl. (stating "passing from one Member State to another while in possession of
a weapon should, in principle, be prohibited... [and] a derogation therefrom is acceptable only
if a procedure is adopted that enables Member States to be notified that a firearm is to be brought
into their territory").
123 Council Directive 91/477/EEC defined a dealer as "any natural or legal person whose
trade or business consists wholly or partly in the manufacture, trade, exchange, hiring out, repair
or conversion of firearms." Id. art. 1, 2.
124 Id. art. 1, 3-4.
125 Id. art. 1, 4.
126 Id. art. 1, 4, Annex II.
127 Id. art. 1, 4.
128 Id.
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The 1991 Directive established four categories of firearms: Category A,
"prohibited firearms"; Category B, "firearms subject to authorization";
Category C, "firearms subject to declaration"; and Category D, "other
firearms." '29 Specific qualifications for acquisition and possession attach to
each category. 3 ° According to the 1991 Directive, Member States should only
allow Category B firearms, requiring authorization, for "good cause," to
individuals who are eighteen years or older and who "are not likely to be a
danger to themselves, to public order or to public safety."'31 The Directive
creates an exception to the Category B age requirement in the case of firearms
used for hunting or target shooting.'32 Category C and D firearms should be
granted only to persons eighteen years or older, again creating an exception for
firearms intended for use in "hunting or target shooting." ' Category C and D
firearms do not include the same personal or public danger provision as
Category B.'34 The rules and requirements applicable to ammunition are based
on the relevant category of firearm.'35
The scope of the 1991 Directive was not intended to reach the acquisition
or possession of firearms by the armed forces, the police, or collectors of
cultural or historical weapons.'36 Commercial transfers of weapons and
ammunition intended for war are also explicitly excluded from the reach of
the 1991 Directive.'
Aside from the specific requirements placed on private owners of firearms,
the 1991 Directive lays out a series of rules for dealers. Member States may
allow dealers to engage in the trade of Category A and B firearms only "upon
authorization on the basis of at least a check on the private and professional
integrity of the dealer."'3 Each dealer is required to keep a register of
transactions for five years, which should include enough information regarding
each firearm so as to facilitate identification of the weapon by the police, as
well as the name and address of both the "supplier and the person acquiring the
[firearm]."' 39  Article 11 provides the procedural requirements for dealer
129 Id. Annex I.
130 Id. arts. 5-8.
131 Id. art. 5.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. art. 10.
136 Id. art. 2.
137 id.
138 Id. art. 4.
139 Id.
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transfers of firearms between Member States, specifically including mail order
sales. 40
The Directive provides, only in general terms, that Member States should
impose penalties "sufficient to promote compliance" when persons fail to
comply with the provisions of the Directive.'41
Pursuant to the mandate of the 1991 Directive, 42 the Commission produced
a Report on the Directive's implementation after all Member States had
transplanted it into national law. 43 After reviewing the general complaints of
Member States regarding the implementation of the 1991 Directive, the
Commission made several specific suggestions for improvement of the
Directive based on two major areas of concern: the operation of the European
firearms pass (EFP) and the exchange of information between Member
States.' 44 First, the Report recognized that the EFP did not facilitate the
efficient movement of persons, as it was originally intended to do. 45  To
improve the operation of the EFP, the Report suggested that the EFP should
better distinguish between "firearms in general and firearms used for sport and
hunting which can be governed by more flexible rules";' that all information
on the EFP should be entered by only one Member State, instead of splitting
the responsibility between the State of origin and the destination State;, 47 and
that there should be "more transparency"'" and non-discrimination for
"agreements on mutual recognition of national documents" between Member
States.49  In addition, the Report recommended the creation of a "Contact
Group" that would provide a forum for coordinating the Directive's
"application and enforcement."'55 To clarify the scope of the Directive, the
Report recommended better definitions of each weapon type, specifically those
firearms falling outside the Directive's scope.' In addition, the Report
140 Id. art. 11, 1.
141 Id. art. 16.
142 Id. art. 17.
43 2000 Implementation Report, supra note 91.
144 Id. 90, at 17.
145 Id. 40, at 10, 94, at 18 (noting that "the free movement of persons is impeded even
when they are in possession of the [EFP] because they are subject to excessive controls by the
Member States" and that "there is a need to establish procedures that are more in line with the
objectives of the [EFP]").
14 Id. 91, at 17.
147 Id. 1195, at 18.
148 Id. 1198, at 18.
149 Id. 97, at 18.
130 Id 102, at 19.
151 See id. 105, at 19-20 (noting that Some Member States "prohibit certain weapons that
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emphasized that any changes to the 1991 Directive might need to include new
obligations created by the UN Protocol, which at the time of the Report was in
the negotiations phase.'52
The 2008 amendments reflect many of the suggestions made by the 2000
Report, including the additional Community obligations created by the UN
Protocol on the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. In an
attempt to confront new challenges facing the European Union, the 2008
amendments expand the scope of Directive 91/477/EEC, now addressing such
issues as illicit manufacturing and trafficking.
First, the 2008 Directive addresses the conversion of weapons-a form of
illicit manufacturing that has become a prevalent concern in the Member
States "'53 by expanding and clarifying definitions found in the 1991 Directive."
The 2008 amendments expand the definition of firearm to include "any
portable barreled weapon" that "may be converted to expel a shot, bullet or
projectile by the action of a combustible propellant."'55 The amendment goes
further by elaborating on the meaning of converted, defining such an object as
one "capable of being converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile" when the
are considered to be hunting firearms in other Member States").
152 Id. I 117-121, at 21-22.
153 Replica Weapons 'Posing Threat, 'BBC NEWS, Oct. 31, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol
pda/ifs-news/hi/newsid_7070000/7070547.stm; Nicola Smith, Germans Sell British Gangs
Replica Guns, TIMES ONLINE (U.K.), Sept. 30,2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/
crime/article2558291.ece. Although these articles refer to converted weapons as replicas, there
is some indication from the text of both the UN Protocol and the 2008 amendments that
convertedweapons and replica weapons refer to two categories of objects with only the potential
to overlap. Converted weapons are those which could eventually expel a combustible propellant,
whereas a replica might be capable of conversion, but in some cases will never be capable of
expelling a combustible propellant. Under the current 2008 amendments, converted weapons
fall within the scope of the legislation. Compare Directive 2008/51/EC, supra note 8, art. 1,
1(a) (including in the definition of firearms converted weapons or weapons capable of
conversion) with id. 12 (calling for a report to be submitted in 2010 on the possibility and
desirability of including replica firearms in the legislation). The Commission's concern with
replicas may be in response to a rise in crimes committed by non-lethal, non-convertible replica
firearms. Replica Guns, BBC INSIDE OUT, Jan. 12,2004, http://www.bbc.co.uk/insideout/yorksl
incs/series5/guncrimereplicaweapons.shtml." Replica Weapons Directive 2008/5 I/EC, supra
note 8, pmbl., para. 4 (noting that "[p]olice intelligence evidence shows an increase in the use
of converted weapons within the Community. It is therefore essential to ensure that
such convertible weapons are brought within the definition of a firearm for the purposes of
Directive 91/477/EEC.").
"' Directive 2008/51/EC, supra note 8, art. 1, l(a).
155 Id.
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object "has the appearance of a firearm," and the object's construction or
component material "can so be converted."' 56
The 2008 amendments provide other technical definitions that were absent
in Article 12(2) of the original legislation'57 in response to a complaint
published in the 2000 Report.5 8 Specifically, the 2008 Directive defines a
firearm part for purposes of the Directive, as well an essential component.'59
These definitions are pertinent to the issue of converted weapons, as they
provide law enforcement and national governments with a uniform source for
identifying potentially illegal firearm parts. This provides for a more
comprehensive regulatory response to illicit manufacturing, as converted
weapons are easily "re-manufactured" from readily available firearm
component parts. 60 With only minor exceptions, these definitions track the
language set forth in the UN Protocol.'
6
'
Second, the 2008 Directive significantly expands the original legislation to
include both illicit manufacturing and illicit trafficking activities. 62 The
amendment calls for a definition of actions or behavior qualifying as illicit
manufacturing. The "manufacturing or assembly of firearms, their parts and
ammunition" qualifies as illicit if it is constructed "from any essential
component of such firearms illicitly trafficked"; if the manufacturer is not
authorized pursuant to Article 4 of the 1991 Directive; or if the manufacturer
does not properly mark the firearms at the time and place of assembly.
63
The 2008 Directive proceeds to define illicit trafficking as the cross-border
"acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts or
ammunition" between Member States when none of the Member States
authorizes the transfer, or if the firearms are transferred unmarked." These
definitions also track the language of the UN Protocol.
165
In direct response to the UN Protocol, the 2008 Directive requires the
marking of firearms "[flor the purpose of identifying and tracing each
assembled firearm."'" If a firearm is not marked, the Member State must
156 Id.
157 Id. art. l, (1)(b).
158 See 2000 Implementation Report, supra note 91, 92, at 17 (noting that Article 12(2)
"contains, as it stands, certain contradictions and ambiguities").
'59 Directive 2008/51/EC, supra note 8, art. 1, 1(b).
6o See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
161 UN Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3.
162 Directive 2008/5 1/EC, supra note 8, pmbl., 6.
163 Id. art. 1, 1(d).
164 Id.
'65 UN Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3(d)-(e).
'66 Directive 2008/51/EC, supra note 8, art. 1, 2.
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ensure that the firearm is deactivated.'67 The marking must meet specific
requirements: most notably, the marking must be "affixed to an essential
component of the firearm, the destruction of which would render the firearm
unusable."' 68  Marking requirements apply to packages of complete
ammunition." 9 Governments are not exempt from all marking requirements,
as they must ensure that firearms are properly marked at the time of firearm
transfers "from government stocks to permanent civilian use."' 70 The marking
must "permit ready identification by all States of the country of
manufacture."71
The 2008 Directive also expands the responsibilities of the entities involved
in firearm sales or transfers. Regarding dealers, the legislation requires
Member States to perform "at least a check of the private and professional
integrity and of the abilities of the dealer.'' 72 Unlike the requirements of
the 1991 Directive, the dealer is required to turn over to the Member State a
register of all activities, including particular information regarding transfers,
after the dealer has ceased his activities.'73 The 2008 Directive also includes
language that authorizes Member States to more rigorously track the activities
of dealers. The Directive requires the dealer to promptly communicate
information regarding a firearm transfer in certain circumstances. Upon
notification, Member State authorities shall "carry out inspections, where
appropriate on the spot, to verify the correspondence between the information
communicated by the dealer and the actual characteristics of the transfer."'74
Regarding Member States, the 2008 Directive requires national
governments to establish and maintain "a computerised data-filing system" to
which authorized authorities are guaranteed access.'75 Each firearm subject to
the Directive must be recorded in this system, as well as the name and address
167 Directive 2008/5 1/EC amends Annex I to Council Directive 91/477/EEC by providing
specific deactivation requirements. This includes ensuring that "all essential parts of the firearm
have been rendered permanently inoperable and incapable of removal, replacement or a
modification that would permit the firearm to be reactivated in any way .... Id. art. 1,
13(b)(i)(a).
168 Id. art. 1, 2.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
.72 Id. (emphasis added). Only the italicized portion refers to modifications of Directive
91/477/EEC.
173 Id. art. 1,72.
174 Id. art. 1,77.
175 Id. art. 1,72.
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of each person possessing or acquiring the firearm. 76  The system must
maintain this information for twenty years. 177 The 2008 Directive also requires
Member States to control internet acquisitions, or "distance contracts."' 78
Finally, the 2008 Directive requires Member States to impose more stringent
non-compliance penalties, mandating that penalties be "effective, proportionate
and dissuasive."' 79  The 1991 Directive, by contrast, required only that
penalties be "sufficient to promote compliance."'' 80
Regarding the Commission, the 2008 Directive requires the establishment
of a contact group "for the exchange of information for the purposes of
applying this Article."'' In addition, the 2008 amendments call for the
creation of a committee to assist the Commission. 82 Both of these changes
respond directly to concerns over the original implementation of the 1991
Directive identified by Member States in the 2000 Implementation Report,
discussed above.1
83
Regarding potential firearms purchasers, the 2008 Directive only permits
purchases by "persons who have good cause,"'" are over the age of eighteen
(except for minors acquiring a firearm for hunting or target shooting and under
the "permission" or "guidance" of a parent), and "are not likely to be a danger
to themselves, to public order or to public safety."' 85  Unlike the 1991
Directive, the 2008 amendments provide an example of the non-fulfillment of
the last criterion, providing that "[h]aving been convicted of a violent
intentional crime shall be considered as indicative of such danger.' 186 In
addition, these requirements apply to all categories of firearms-a significant
departure from the specific, categorical requirements under the 1991
Directive.
8 7
176 id.
177 Id. The UN Protocol, by contrast, required signatories to maintain records of each firearm
in this recording system for "not less than ten years." UN Protocol, supra note 7, art. 7, para. 1.
178 Directive 2008/51/EC, supra note 8, art. 1, 5.
179 Id. art. 1, 11.
180 Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 4, art. 16.
181 Directive 2008/51/EC, supra note 8, art. 1, 9.
182 Id. art. 1, 10.
183 2000 Implementation Report, supra note 91, IM 100-103, at 19.
' 8 The 2008 amendments do not elaborate on what constitutes "good cause," but imply that
good cause will be determined by the Member State: "Member States may withdraw
authorisation for possession of a firearm if any of the conditions on the basis of which it was
granted are no longer satisfied." Directive 2008/5 1/EC, supra note 8, art. 1, 4.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 4, art. 5.
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V. SUCCESS OR FAILURE: WILL THE 2008 AMENDMENTS
CURB ACCESS TO ILLICIT FIREARMS IN THE EU?
The open internal border policy of the European Union offers the citizens
of Member States, visitors of Europe, and other entities operating businesses
across the continent generally free and unimpeded movement within the EU.
As a result of this internal border transformation, the European Union has
experienced a great deal of economic success.' Yet, with all the benefits of
an open European Community come the disadvantages to security: Member
States no longer have the authority to control their internal borders. The free
flow of persons and goods has proven a major advantage to trade and economic
well-being, but controlling the free flow of unwanted goods and people has
proven a difficult reality and an ever-present concern to Member States.
Council Directive 91/477/EEC appeared as a major, unified response to the
need to balance freedom of movement with the Member States' expectations
of security. Highly-publicized violence, issues with implementation, and new
international obligations led the consensus in the European Parliament to push
for amendments to the 1991 Directive. The amendments were well received
and in 2008 became legally binding on the Member States. Yet, do these
amendments provide an effective legal framework for an actual reduction in the
flow of illicit firearms within the European Community?. It is the position of
this Note that while significantly improving upon the 1991 Directive, the legal
framework created by the 2008 Directive remains too weak to counter the flow
of illicit firearms facilitated by organized crime networks, arms brokers, and
individuals with an incentive to profit financially from the demand created by
strict regulation.
Despite consensus for the 2008 amendments, galvanized by the objectives
of the UN Protocol and necessitated by violence in the Member States, the
legislation only attempts the bare minimum. While providing a legal
framework for the potential prosecution or penalization of conduct involving
firearms, firearm parts, or ammunition, the 1991 and 2008 Directives lack
"teeth," for they take a weak stance on non-compliance and do little to reduce
black market demand. The legislation fails to adequately address the very
entities that actually thrive off of strict regulation-arms brokers, organized
crime networks, and individuals conducting straw transactions. Because it
188 See Sindor Richter, The First Three Years in the EU - A Clear Economic Success, 6
STATISTIKA 437 (2007), available at http://panda.hyperlink.cz/cestapdf/pdf07c6/richter.pdf
(discussing the economic success of the Eastern European countries as a result of their inclusion
in the EU).
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lacks a more decisive stance on the roots of the illicit firearm trade in the
European Union, the legislation will do little to reduce the success of the black
market.
The 2008 amendments stand the best chance to limit (though not eliminate)
the activities of those individuals who seek to profit from stringent regulation
through straw transactions. 89 As noted in Part 1I, these transactions are more
likely to occur in countries with strong regulation and licensing
requirements.'" As such, the very existence of the legislation incentivizes
individuals to profit from potentially high demand and little "supply" (or
extremely low access to supply due to regulatory red tape). The situation is
complicated further by the difficulty of monitoring small or individual
transactions. Given these factors, the legislation probably will not reduce the
likelihood of any one transaction, but stands a good chance of reducing straw
purchases in the aggregate. Several additions from the 2008 amendments lead
to this conclusion.
First, the technical amendments to the 1991 Directive-regarding definitions
and the added requirement for marking all firearms-will likely assist Member
States in identifying more violations by individuals. By requiring the marking
of all firearms and by requiring Member States to connect the marking
information with the original owner, the original owner may have less incentive
to pass the firearm to the second owner in the straw transaction when he knows
that the firearm is tied to his name. Also, the more inclusive definition of
firearm will make it more difficult for a savvy individual to exploit the
technical differences between Member State regulations. However, individuals
sufficiently motivated by the profit margin on an illicit firearm will likely find
ways to exploit the limitations of the Directive. For example, the original
owner in the straw transaction could immediately claim the firearm was stolen,
which is a common way for firearms to enter illicit channels. 9 '
The 2008 amendments have much less force against illicit trafficking by
arms brokers. In a curious manner, the EU does include the definition of an
arms broker and recognizes that future attention to the trade may be required,
but only suggests such regulation to the Member States."9 The amendments
go on to suggest what such a regulatory system might include: either the
8 Again, a straw transaction occurs when a legally acquired firearm is obtained and then
sold to a second owner in avoidance of legal procedure. CuKiER, supra note 38, at 7.
190 Id.
191 See supra note 33 and accompanying illustration (identifying theft as a possible black-
market entry point).
'92 See Directive 2008/5 1/EC, supra note 8, art. 1, 3 (noting that "Member States shall
consider establishing a system for the regulation of the activities of arms brokers").
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registration of broker activity within the Member State's territory or "requiring
the licensing or authorisation" of broker activity.'93 Given the exploitative and
manipulative nature of many arms brokers-particularly those willing to meet
the demand for illicit firearms-asking Member States only to consider
regulating broker activity significantly undermines the EU's commitment to the
UN Convention and Protocol. Unlike the UN Protocol,"9 the 2008
amendments fail to encourage the storage or exchange of information regarding
brokers or brokering. Failing to codify the inclusion of brokers and brokering
information in the computerized data-filing system creates a large gap in the
tracing mechanism introduced by the 2008 amendments. The absence of
information on arms brokers and their activities in this system renders the
tracking mechanism for potentially illicit firearms incomplete and ineffective.
As previously noted, the 2008 amendments do present several legislative
responses to issues identified by the UN Protocol and by the 2000
Implementation Report. Notably, the 2008 amendments finally bring illicit
manufacturing and illicit trafficking into the scope of the Directive. As
identified in Figure 1 on page 243,195 illicit manufacturing is often the first step
in the life of an illicit firearm. While statistics indicate that most firearms are
manufactured legally,'96 addressing the small market for illicitly manufactured
firearms becomes essential in light of the durability and longevity of the
weapon. The 2008 amendments not only define illicit manufacturing, but also
bring the actions defining the violation to the forefront of the issue by outlining
exactly what will be considered illicit behavior. Because the licit
manufacturing of a firearm in a Member State will involve the proper marking
of the firearm, the amendments attempt to place a permanent tracing device on
the product-a potential benefit to both the Member State and any law-
enforcement agency that may need the information in the future. The
amendments also include manufacturing from illicit firearm parts and
manufacturing firearms without the proper authorization of the Member State
as violations of the Directive. While the legislation may not reduce the
frequency or number of violations, it does provide Member States with a wider
net for prosecuting illicit manufacturers.
193 Id.
194 UN Protocol, supra note 7, art. 15, 2.
'9' See supra note 33 and accompanying illustration (identifying illicit production as an entry
point of firearms into illicit trade channels).
196 See KRAUSE, supra note 34, at 7 (stating that "virtually all illicit weapons transferred
were, at some point in their life, legally produced or procured").
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Similarly, the inclusion of illicit trafficking and its definition in the 2008
Directive allows Member States an avenue for prosecuting illicit cross-border
transfers when discovered. For purposes of the Directive, a transfer is illicit
when it lacks authorization or the firearms are not marked.'97 Again, this
portion of the Directive highlights the Community's general commitment to the
objectives of the UN Protocol by attempting to provide incentives for the
marking and tracing of all firearms, firearm parts, and ammunition
manufactured and transferred within the European Community. Yet the
Directive does little more than define illicit manufacturing and trafficking and
require Member States to penalize the perpetrators of these activities in an
"effective, proportionate and dissuasive 19 ' manner.
Further, though recognizing definitions of illicit manufacturing and illicit
trafficking, the 2008 amendments fail to adequately address the groups
generally involved in these activities: organized crime networks. The 2008
amendments do not define what constitutes organized crime for the purposes
of the Directive. Nor do the amendments specifically criminalize the illicit
transfer of firearms; the Preamble of the Directive merely states that "[i]n some
serious cases, compliance with ... the Protocol requires the application of
criminal sanctions and the confiscation of the weapons."1  Also, the 2008
amendments do not require the criminalization of Directive violations; they
only require that "penalties . . . must be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive."" °
In further degradation of the effort to combat the black market for illicit
firearms in the EU, the 2008 amendments do not properly denounce other
mechanisms by which organized crime networks feed the demand for illicit
firearms-namely, conversion of replica firearms and other non-lethal objects,
recycling of deactivated firearms, or theft of firearms from legal owners or
manufacturers. The legislation does address conversion by adding converted
weapons to the definition offirearm, but the Directive does not declare the act
of conversion to be a violation. While it is true that not all forms of conversion
are illicit, the Directive takes great pains only to recognize the act of converting
a firearm or its parts or ammunition, instead of requiring Member States to
penalize certain acts of conversion-namely, those performed on toy guns or
other non-lethal objects capable of such. For example, the conversion of a
197 Directive 2008/51/EC, supra note 8, art. 1, 1.
'9' Id. art. 1, T 11.
'99 Id. pmbl., 110.
'00 Id. art. 1, 11.
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weapon would qualify a person as a dealer2°'-an entity authorized under the
Directive to engage in the trade of firearms following only minor procedural
inquiries.
Other frequent mechanisms by which firearms surface in illicit
channels-principally the recycling or theft of weapons °--are not addressed
in the Directive. Nor does the Directive address the fact that firearms and their
components often appear in the same shipments with drugs or other black
market goods.2 3 Instead, the Directive appears to focus only on the minor
violations resulting from the cross-border movement of firearms amongst the
Member States-it does not appear to address major violations to any
substantial degree.
The 1991 Directive and the 2008 amendments do little to combat the black
market for illicit firearms and instead focus on ever-more precise regulation of
already-legal firearm owners. In reality, the illicit firearm trade may not be an
area capable of regulation; indeed, the black market is a creature of the very
existence of strict regulation. In other words, high regulation creates a gap in
supply, which organized crime, arms brokers, and straw purchasers exist to
satisfy.2" In return, these illicit actors receive substantial profit margins
otherwise unavailable in a market absent of regulatory restrictions to access.
Although it may seem counterintuitive to those seeking to reduce violent crime,
the removal of intense regulation may be the only way to eliminate the black
market for illicit firearms.
Finally, the weakness of the 2008 amendments may be tied to the structural
challenges associated with the European Union, especially with regard to the
sensitive issue of firearm ownership. The legislation is wrought with
compromise. As noted by Gisela Kallenbach during a debate in the European
Parliament regarding the 2008 amendments:
I have learned a great deal throughout this process. I have
learned about the true role that lobbyists can play: some of them
contributed constructively to achieving common solutions,
whereas others deliberately set out to obstruct the process with
half-truths and misinformation. From the outset, it was obvious
201 Id. art. 1, 1(c).
202 Spapens, supra note 26, at 365.
203 Naylor, supra note 28, at 48-49.
204 See Jeffrey A. Miron, Violence, Guns, and Drugs: A Cross-Country Analysis, 44 J.L. &
EcON. 615, 618 (2001) (reasoning that "[p]rohibitions of goods for which there is substantial
demand and imperfect substitutes generally give rise to black markets").
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to me that it is no simple matter to strike the right balance
between the requirements of a well-functioning internal market,
the justified safety concerns of citizens about the illegal use of
firearms and the understandable desire of hunters and sports
marksmen to pursue their hobbies largely unhindered .... I
admit that I would have preferred even more clear-cut provisions
here and there, for example in order to achieve better legislation
or to simplify matters .... However, I was unable to secure
majorities here.2 5
Although Member States may agree that access to illicit firearms is a major
concern to Member States, the complex political nature of the European Union
may render a single, effective legislative response unattainable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1991 Directive created a legal framework for the harmonization of
Member State law regarding the possession and acquisition of firearms.
Despite feelings of relative success by the Member States regarding
implementation,2 6 the EU found it necessary to amend the 1991 Directive to
address the weaknesses identified during implementation and to bring the EU
into compliance with the newly-signed UN Protocol dealing with illicit
firearms in relation to transnational organized crime. Given the EU's
commitment to the reduction of criminal access to illicit firearms-as
evidenced by its support of the UN Protocol-the 2008 amendments provide
the EU an opportunity to challenge the Member States to create a unified
legislative front against the black market for firearms in Europe. Although the
2008 amendments succeed in bringing illicit manufacturing, trafficking, and
brokering into the scope of the Directive, the amendments fail to create a
regulatory environment sufficient to counter the lucrative efforts associated
with firearm trafficking. The 2008 amendments will likely strengthen the EU's
effort to limit firearm access to the general population, but the amendments do
not appear comprehensive enough in either scope or force to confront the
highly incentivized black market for firearms on the European continent.
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